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Malware-generating engines challenge typical malware analysts by requiring them to
quickly extract and upload to their customers' machines, a signature for each of a possi-
bly vast number of never-before-seen malware instances that an engine can generate in a
short amount of time In this thesis we propose and evaluate two methods for'linking va-
riants of engine-generated malware to its engine. The proposed methods use the w-gram
frequency vector (NFV) of the opcode mnemonics of an engine-generated malware in-
stance as a feature vector for the instance. An NFV is a tuple that maps «-grams with
their frequencies. The in-formation contained within the NFV of an engine-generated
malware instance is then used to attribute the instance to the engine. The first method im-
plements a Bayesian-like classifier that uses 1-gram frequency vectors of programs as
feature vectors. This method was successfully evaluated on a sample of benign programs
and one of malicious programs from the W 3 2. Simile family of self-mutating mal-
ware. The second method, which is an extension of the first method, uses optimized
2-gram frequency vectors as feature vectors and classifies malware by computing its
proximity to the average of the NFVs of instances known to have been generated by a
known engine. The second method was successfully evaluated on four
ma)ware-generating engines: W32 . Simile, W32.Evol, W32.NGCVK, and W32.VCL.
The evaluation yielded a set of four 1 7-tuples of doubles as signatures for each of the en-
gines, and achieved a 95% discrimination accuracy between a sample of benign programs
and samples of malware instances that were generated by these engines. Accuracies of
94.8% were achieved for engine signatures of size 6. 8 and, 14 doubles. We also used
IV
four k-rm classifiers which, unlike the second method, require the time-consuming task of
creating and storing one signature per known malware instance, to countercheck the ac-
curacies achieved by the second method. This work is inspired by successful methods for
attributing natural language texts to their respective authors. The proposed methods may
be viewed as filtering (or decision support) tools that malware detectors may use to de-
termine whether extensive engine-specific program analyses such as emulation and con-
trol tlow analysis are needed on a suspect program.
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This chapter presents the general problem of malware detection. We first give a
definition for the different types of malware, and then we give an overview of the tradi-
tional methods for detecting malware and how engine-generated malware challenges cur-
rent detectors. Finally we enumerate the methods proposed in this thesis to improve the
accuracy and speed of malware detectors at attributing engine-generated malware to its
engine.
LI A Brief Look at Malware
Malware, short for malicious software, is a program designed to potentially disrupt the
normal functioning of a system in which it executes [8, 9]. The term computer virus is
commonly used to mean malware, but the definition of malware expands to include other
forms of malicious programs. These programs include computer worms, Trojan Horses,
adware and spyware.
1.1.1 Classification
A computer virus is malware that, when executed, tries to attach itself to other
files without the knowledge of the user [2, 9]. Brain is one example of an early computer
virus [22] A computer worm is standalone malware (i.e.. it does not need to attach itself
to other files) that is able to spread across a network [2, 29]. A common example of this
type of malware is the 2003 SQL Slammer worm which spread fast and affected millions
of computers in a short period of time. In addition to causing damage to the infected sys-
tem, worms also consume a lot of bandwidth. A Trojan Horse is malware that appears
benign but may perform malicious actions that could allow unauthorized access to the
system on which it was installed. Adware is malware that generates unsolicited ads usual-
ly through pop ups. Spyware is malware that attempts to capture personal information and
transmit it to the attacker. Detailed definitions of these and other classes of malware are
given by Szor in [30] and by Aycock in [2].
Malware has evolved through various stages in an attempt to evade detection and
be able to execute its malicious payload. Armored viruses are those viruses which use
code obfuscation to make their code harder to reverse engineer, without altering its func-
tionality [30]. Figure 1.1 shows an example of an obfuscating transformation, where a
predicate is crafted so that its value is always "true" and so that the obfuscator is able to
insert an unreachable set of code fragments.
Figure 1.1: Code obfuscation: The predicate may be crafted so that the 'YES"1 path will always be
taken. The 'NO' path is dead code that has been inserted for the sole purpose of hardening static
analysis.
Encryption of a malware's binary is another form of obfuscation where the intent
is to harden disassembly or make it impossible. Malware that encrypts its own code is of-
ten called polymorphic malware [30J. Kaspersky Lab determined that almost all of to-
day's malware are polymorphic, making it difficult to develop detection and disinfection
procedures within an acceptable time frame [14].
A morphing engine is a program whose purpose is to change the appearance or
the semantics of the malware. Malware which carries its own engine is called metamor-
phic malware [5, 8, 24]. A breakdown of the structure of a metamorphic malware is given
by Walenstein et al. [3, 34]. Malware which invokes a remote engine with the malware
code as input in order for the engine to transform its appearance or semantics is called
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Figure 1.2: Morphing Engine: On input a malware instance, the engine is able to generate arbitrarily
many variants of that instance.
Metamorphic malware is henceforth viewed as a subclass of morphing malware. A va-
riant of a morphing malware is a program that was generated by a malware-morphing
engine [2, 8]. This work specifically targets malware, of any of the above classes, that is
generated by a machine, not by a human.
1.1.2 Current State of Threat
The last several years marked the start of a new period characterized by a rapid
increase in the number of malicious programs. Figure 1.3 shows the sharp increase in the
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Figure 1.3: Malware growth per year, the number of malicious programs tripled in 2008. Source
F-Secure, 2008Q4[13|.
According to Kaspersky Lab [14] there is separation of the design tasks by the
malware authors, where different people participate at the different stages of malware de-
sign, and later combine the work hence making it complex. Microsoft Security Intelli-
gence Report determined that there was a large increase in the number of worms detected
across the world in the first half of 2009. It also reports that computers in corporate envi-
ronments were more likely to be infected by worms than home computers. According to
Microsoft Security Intelligence Report, malware creators often release variants for a fam-
ily which are typically used in an effort to avoid being detected by security software.
Another factor that has contributed to a fast increase in the level of malware threats is the
availability of underground funding for malware hosting and distribution, which made
malware more accessible to cyber criminals [25].
There were approximately of 5.5 million malware instances analyzed in 2007,
which on average involved analyzing between 15.000 and 20,000 new malware instances
each day. This is more than four times the average number of malware instances analyzed
per day, compared to 2006 [31]. Another reason that has contributed to this rapid increase
is the hiring of professionals by malware shops. These professionals also do quality as-
surance to ensure the complexity of the software [4]. Malware authors automate the crea-
tion and spread of malware to ensure that the malware spreads fast and to challenge ma-
nual malware analysis [4].
Anti-virus companies, in an attempt to cap the rapid growth in volume, have come
up with generic detectors to detect a wider range of "related"* malware instances. This ap-
proach, though faster than using one signature per malware instance, has resulted in high
rates of false positives, where benign programs were mistaken for malicious. An example
of a false positive is when Kaspersky Lab misclassified Windows Explorer as malicious
in December 2007. Team-Cymru. a malware research firm, submitted 1000 samples of
malware to 32 different commercial antivirus firms. Out of these 1000 samples, 630 sam-
ples went unnoticed [10].
1.1.3 Engine-generated Malware
Engine-generated malware is that which has been generated by a machine, per-
haps after being given some user input. Malware generating engines include the so-called
"virus generation toolkits'" that are often available for free download by anyone over the
Internet, as well as morphing engines. We continue our discussion of morphing engines
to further illustrate the concept of a malware-generating engine.




















Please enter name of the Author ( you *Q" J and
the name the virus should have.
Figure 1.4 : The Next Generation Virus Creation Kit.
Morphing engines use source-to-source transformations such as code substitution
(e.g., code expansion and code compression), garbage insertion, code permutation, and
register renaming to modify a malware instance's appearance without necessarily pre-
serving its functionality [34]. Code expansion (see Figure 1.5 for an example) is a trans-
formation where one code segment is replaced with a larger code segment. An indirect
call instruction, for instance, can be morphed by computing the sum S of two variables on
the program's stack, which are known beforehand, and then jumping to the location
pointed to by S. Code compression (see Figure 1.5 for an example) is a transformation
where a code segment is replaced with a smaller code segment. Code compression also
aims at eliminating garbage instructions from the code. Code permutation (see Figure 1 .5
for an example) makes use of direct jump instructions to reorder the lines of code while
maintaining the control flow of the program being transformed. Garbage insertion (see
Figure 1 .5 for an example) adds do-nothing instructions to the malware code.
Examples of existing metamorphic malware include W32. Simile,
W95.Zmist and W32.Evol. Examples of malware generation toolkits include
W32 . NGCVK and W32 . VCL [11, 27, 29]. The gtvery user-friendly" interface of NGVCK is
shown in Figure 1 .4.
1.1.4 Malware Detection
Malware detectors (also referred to as anti-virus scanners) are programs whose main task
is to search their host computing system for the presence or absence of malware [5]. They
may also be invoked manually or automatically to determine whether a given program is
malware.
Since the size of malware code may range from just a few lines of code to a large
number of lines of code, including multiple procedure calls, malware detectors typically
use malware signatures (also called malware definitions) to detect malware. A malware
signature is a sequence of bytes and/or patterns that occur in malware's binary and that
can be used to uniquely identify the binary. A malware signature should be specific to the
identified malware or malware family so as to avoid false positives and false negatives.
Anti-virus analysts need to have an up-to-date knowledge of the current vulnera-
bilities and exploits which could be targeted by malware authors [29], this way a signa-
ture can be custom-built to recognize patterns in the malware code which indicate that the
code may be able to exploit a given vulnerability. They sometimes rely on submissions
by individuals and organizations of new malware samples for which signatures may not
yet have been extracted by the anti-virus analysts. Szor describes a number of approaches
used by anti-virus analysts to analyze malware. extract a signature for it, and then use the
signature for detection purposes [29]. Malware detection is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 2.
1.2 Challenges
In his pioneering work on computer viruses, Cohen formally proves that no mal-
ware detector can possibly be constructed that can perfectly detect all the current and fu-
ture malware instances in a finite amount of time [9J. One other, more practical, chal-
lenge that anti-virus analysts face is the need to provide a signature in a timely manner
while keeping up with the rate at which never-before-seen malware instances show up in
the wild, since malware signature databases must be updated frequently to add signatures
for newly released malware [33]. One condition for a malware detector to be efficient is
that the malware signature database be as small as possible in order to reduce the time
taken to update it and scan it. Also, if a malware signature database is large and requires
an inordinate amount of space and time to search and update, a user might be tempted to
ignore requests by the malware detector to update its database or to scan the computer for
the presence of malware.
In this thesis we propose a method for efficiently attributing engine-generated
malware to its engine, which we hope will address the challenge of having to store one
signatute for each of a possibly vast number of malware instances that a given engine
may be able to autonomously produce in a short amount of time.
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Figure 1.5: Morphing Transformations: A selection of the source-to-source transformations used by
morphing engines to change the appearance of maiware in-stances.
1.3 Our Contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions.
• We propose and evaluate a method for discriminating between variants of the
W32 . Simile metamorphic malware and a sample of benign program. The me-
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thod uses an optimized instruction frequency vector of a program as a feature vec-
tor for the program. The method is successfully evaluated, with a success rate of
100%, for optimized instruction frequency vectors composed of only 4 real num-
bers.
• We propose and evaluate a method for attributing malware generated by the
W32.VCL engine, the W32.NGVCK engine, and the engines of W32. Simile
and W32 . Evol, to the engines. The method uses as feature vector for a program
the (possibly optimized) «-gram frequency vector of the program's opcode mne-
monics, for some positive integer n. The method is evaluated for n = 2, with a
success rate of 95% for optimized bigram frequency vectors composed of only 17
doubles. An accuracy of 94.8% was achieved for 6, 8 and 14 doubles. The method
asks that only the average of the optimized bigram frequency vectors of known
variants be used as a signature for the engine that generated the variants.
The proposed methods only require the malware detector to disassemble a suspect pro-
gram before feeding it into a classifier that implements the proposed methods.
1.4 Impact of Our Contributions
The proposed methods are expected to improve those detectors that use static and
dynamic program analyses to extract malware signatures in the following ways:
• Both methods were time efficient. A full experimental evaluation of the methods
(involving 500 different subjects) completed in 4 minutes. This is a relatively
good time, given the fact that the program was running on a Java virtual machine.
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• The second method allows the detector to be more space efficient. 1 he space re-
quired to store the best performing signature is the space needed to store 17
doubles.
• The detection accuracies of both methods, especially that of the second method,
suggest that the large body of work in forensic linguistics may be worth tapping
into. The proposed methods where inspired by works which have been successful-
ly used by forensic linguists to attribute natural language texts to their correspond-
ing authors.
1.5 Organization of this Thesis
Chapter 2 gives a detailed statement of the problem of detecting engine-generated
malware. Existing approaches for detecting engine-generated malware are investigated
and their contributions contrasted with those proposed in this thesis to attribute engine-
generated malware to its engine. Chapter 3 describes and evaluates the first detection me-
thod proposed in this thesis. This method uses a program's instruction frequency vector
to link the program to a known malware-generating engine. Chapter 4 describes and eva-
luates the second method that this thesis proposes to attribute engine-generated malware
to its engine. This method uses a program's w-gram frequency vector, for some positive
integer n, to attribute the program to its engine. Chapter 5 concludes this thesis and out-
lines directions for further work.
Chapter 2
The Detection Problem of
Engine-generated Maiware
In this chapter, we visit some of the existing methods for detecting
engine-generated maiware. Each of these methods falls under one or more of the ( 1 ) ge-
neric model, (2) the normalization model, and (3) the engine signature model for detect-
ing engine-generated maiware. We then provide a synopsis of our proposed detection
methods, which fall under the engine signature detection model of engine-generated
maiware.
2.1 Existing Detection Methods
In order to eventually detect a maiware signature, a maiware detector can start by statical-
ly analyzing a suspect program, dynamically analyzing it, or both.
• Static analysis. A suspect program is statically analyzed by going through one or
more of the normal steps in the program analysis pipeline. This is usually done by
disassembling a suspect program, extracting its control flow graph, and then
searching the control flow graph for sub-graphs that may signal a malicious intent
[8, 11, 21]. Static program analysis is inherently hard and may be challenged by
code obfuscation (see Figure 1.1). Figure 2.1 gives a high-level view of the mai-
ware analysis pipeline.
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Dynamic analysis. Malware detectors may also run a suspect program in a virtual
environment that simulates some computing platform. Malware emulation is the
use of a virtual machine to run a suspect program and monitor its behavior. An
emulator may execute a suspect program a given number of times with different
inputs, but the emulation process could become lengthy in a situation where the
program has to be emulated in a real-time environment or if a malware instance
attempts to test the patience of the emulator by entering a do-nothing loop that














Figure 2.1: Malware Analysis Pipeline
Program analysis tools have enabled malware detectors to fairly accurately discrimi-
nate between malicious programs and non malicious ones [7, 23], and any effort made by
a malware detector to detect malware will require a certain amount of program analysis.
The remainder of this section will describe those detection models (which also require
that a certain amount of program analysis be applied by the detector to suspect programs)




The generic detection model is that which requires a malware analyst to analyze a
suspect program by looking for those patterns that the malware analyst expects all of the
variants of that suspect program to have. This model has initially been devised to detect
variants of malware that have been manually generated by slightly altering an existing
malware instance, usually to fix a bug within the instance, or to modify the instance's
malicious behavior. This model is certainly applicable to those engine-generated malware
instances, provided the engine behaves in a manner similar to that of a human, by just al-
tering some "non-essential"" fragments of the malware code to fix a bug, or by slightly
modifying the malware's malicious behavior. Due to the high level of complexity, for a
human's point of view, of assembly language programs, humans typically prefer making
slight alterations to malware code (which is often written in assembly), over major over-
hauls.
Since it relies on the assumption that malware variants are no more than slight
modifications of the other variants, generic detection is not a good match for the problem
of detecting malware whose appearance and/or semantics may be drastically changed by
morphing engines. Engines, after all, are much better than humans (think compilers) at
making conservative decisions about the control flow of a program, and at deciding that
the insertion or deletion of a given set of code fragments from an assembly language pro-
gram will modify the input/output behavior of the program in unintended ways.
Geometrical detectors use the effects caused by a viral infection to the size of an infected
file (e.g. an attachment to a system file or a sudden increase in the file size). Since system
L5
files have known sizes, a change in their sizes may be interpreted as an infection. This
method effectively detects variants of the W9 5/ZMist metamorphic virus but is ineffec-
tive in the detection of non parasitic malware [29].
The generic detection model has actually not been successful at dealing with the
variant generation problem, even for those malware variants that were manually generat-
ed by slightly modifying existing malware instances. A VTest Labs, a German consulting
company that specializes in computer security, has reported in 2008 unacceptably high
levels of false positives and false negatives generated by commercial malware detectors
that use the generic detection model for detecting member of malware families. Their
main concern was that there was no systematic, scientifically testable way of verifying
whether a given generic signature, extracted in a lab by a human analyst, perhaps relying
on a set of "hunches" and with the help of a set of reverse engineering tools, would pro-
duce a single generic signature that is representative of a large enough (say, 90% or
above) portion of a malware family.
2.1.2 Normalization
Normalizers are programs that take as input a suspect program, simplify it in
some fashion (e.g.. by eliminating garbage instructions), and then analyze the output of
the normalizer to determine whether its output is similar to that of a known malware.
Nonnalizers aim to reduce the size of the signature space needed to store a signature for
each instance of engine-generated malware by assuming that multiple instances would be
"simplified" by the normalizer into a small set of normal forms [32]. Since the normalizer
construction problem is known to be unsolvable in general [32], existing methods for
lb
normalizing members of a given malware family may not always scale the problem of
normalizing the members of any malware family. Figure 2.2 gives a pictorial representa-
tion of the normalization model for detecting malware.
Variant 1
Normalize^





Figure 2.2: Normalization: A procedure is constructed that efficiently reduces each malware instance
to a normal form. Instances that belong to a given malware family are expected to be reducible to the
same normal form.
2.1.3 Engine Signatures
The engine signature model for detecting malware [5, 6] asks that forensic evi-
dence be extracted from a suspect program that can be used to link the suspect program to
a known malware-generating engine. This model was inspired by the success that foren-
sic linguists had in attributing, to their authors, documents written in some human lan-
guage such as English. Probabilistic and statistical methods been suggested to attribute
morphed malware variants to the morphing engine that generated them. Chouchane et al.
[7] suggested that Markov chains theory be used to model the morphing process of mal-
17
ware variants, and then construct a filter for engine-generated malware that uses the mor-
pher transition matrix as a signature for the morpher.
EVE





Figure 2.3: Engine Signature: Instead of storing and managing a signature for each malware variant.
A single signature, that of the engine that generated the variants, is used to detect the variants.
Other statistical approaches use as feature vectors a code fragment's sequence of
system calls that is known to be executed by members of a given malware family [26].
These methods work well when the system calls are not obfuscated but. since they make
the assumption that the system calls used as a signature will not be changed by the mor-
pher, they are not of much help in detecting engine-generated malware where the engine
may or may not preserve the malware' s functionality.
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2.2 IFVs and NFVs as Feature Vectors
The proposed detection methods fall under the engine signature detection model
of engine-generated malware; they provide fast, approximate tools for attributing
engine-generated malware to the engine. The following metrics are used to construct a
program's feature vector:
1 A program's instruction frequency vector: This is the vector each of whose com-
ponents holds the frequency, in the program, of a given opcode mnemonic in the
instruction set architecture of the machine on which the program's binary is run-
nable. A program's instruction frequency vector is analogous to the word fre-
quency vector of a document written in some human language. Word frequency
vectors have been shown to contain enough information about a document's hu-
man author to enable a forensic linguist to tell what human author, in a given set
of authors, has written the document whose word frequency vector is being ex-
amined [18].
2 A program's 17-gram frequency vector: This is the vector each of whose compo-
nents holds the frequency, in the program, of a given w-gram, for some fixed posi-
tive integer n, of opcode mnemonics that occur in the instruction set architecture
of the machine on which the program's binary is runnable. A program's w-gram
frequency vector contains more information about the program than the program's
instruction frequency vector, since an w-gram frequency vector also capture the
rate at which the program's author tend to append a given opcode mnemonic to
any given sequence of n-\ opcode mnemonics. Forensic linguists have conducted
L9
a successful empirical evaluation of an authorship attribution method that used
word »-gram frequency vectors to attribute English documents to their authors
[18].
Optimization choices had to be made by us to reduce the size of a program's in-
struction frequency vector and w-gram frequency vector, as well as to allow us to conduct
our extensive experimental evaluations, which involved 500 different programs of vari-
ous sizes, so that they terminate within a reasonable amount of time. Subsequent chapters
elaborate on each of the above methods, describe the experiments that we have conducted
to evaluate them, and discuss the outcome of each of these experiments.
Chapter 3
Using IFVs to Detect Engine-generated
Malware
This chapter describes the first method that we have successfully tried to attribute
engine-generated malware to the engine that produced it. This method uses a statistic
about a suspect program, namely its instruction frequency vector (IFV), to determine
whether the program is engine-generated malware that has been generated by a known
malware generating engine. This method was successfully used to discriminate between
variants of the W32 . Simile malware and benign programs.
3.1 Motivation
The detection method described below only requires the malware's binary be dis-
assembled, saving the malware detector the trouble of having to run potentially time con-
suming program analyses on a suspect binary. Since the IFV of a program does not
change should the code permutation transformation be applied to the program, the detec-
tion accuracy is insensitive to the code permutation transformation that a morphing en-
gine may use, in addition to other source-to-source transformations, to change the ap-
pearance of its input malware variant. The method also reduces the space normally
needed to store a signature for each variant by only requiring that the IFV's of a sample
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of malware instances known to have been generated by a given engine be used to deter-
mine whether a suspect program has been generated by that engine.
3.2 Approach
An Instruction Frequency Vector (IFV) is a vector that maps opcode mnemonics
with their frequencies in an assembly language program. The frequencies of these opcode
mnemonics are recorded as entries in the IFV. IFVs are normalized so that the relative
frequencies of the opcode mnemonics are considered instead of the absolute ones. A pro-
gram's normalized IFV is then used as a feature vector for the program. Consider the fol-
lowing program P, reduced to its sequence of opcode mnemonics.
P : mov, add, mov, add, sub, push, add, mov, sub
Figure 3.1 shows the IFV of P. We will henceforth use the acronym IFV to refer
to a program's normalized instruction frequency vector.
mov add sub push
IFY(P): 3 3 2 1
Normalized: 0.33 0.22 0.22 0.11
Figure 3.1: Computing the Instruction Frequency Vector of P.
We measure the distance between two IFVs using the following distance measure.
hi-i
d{lFVx,lFVy) =
{T ((IFVx) l - (lFVy ))
2
,
where IFVX and IFVy are instruction frequency vectors of program x and program y, re-
spectively.
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Let L(X; S) denote the likelihood that a suspect program X is W32 . Simile giv-
en that a number of W32 . Simile instances are in the vicinity ofX. L(X; S) is expressed
as follows:
\sESim ; d(IFVYJF\0 <€\
L(X t S) = !
Number of trainers within £ of X
Let L(X; B) denote the likelihood that a suspect program X is benign given that a
number of benign instances are in the vicinity ofX. L(X; B) is expressed as follows:
_ \s€Bgn:d{lFVxt IFVb)<€\
L [A , o J — ; ; —Numoer of trainers within £ of X
A discriminator between benign programs and malware generated by
W32 . Simile's engine can then be designed to operate as follows:
1
.
Take as input the IFV of a suspect program X.
2. Choose a threshold s > 0.
3. Find the IFV's of existing benign and W32 . Simile samples (trainers) that are
within of the IFV of the suspect program.
4. Compute the number ofW32 . Simile trainers within ofX
5. Compute the number of benign trainers within ofX
6. The family that has the highest number of trainers within s of X is declared to be
X~s family; if there is a tie, choose one at random.
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3.2.1 Evaluation
We downloaded W32 . Simile's eve program from vx.nellux.org [15]. We then
extracted the opcode mnemonics from the eve and performed the code substitution (ex-
pansion and compression), code permutation, and garbage insertion transformations.
These transformations simulated those described by The Mental Driller, the "author of
W32 . Simile, on how he implemented W32 . Simile's morphing engine [16]. This op-
tion (i.e., implementing a simulator for the engine) is more efficient and secure than ac-
tually running the malware and waiting for it to mutate, which it may or may not do on
any given run. One hundred variants of W32 . Simile's eve were generated using the
simulator.
We collected 100 benign programs. These benign programs were downloaded
from download.cnet.com [12] and sourceforge.net [28]. These programs were disassem-
bled using Ollydbg [17] and the IFV for each program was generated.
We grouped all of the benign and malicious IFVs into training and testing sets.
Each training set consisted of 50 instances from each sample and the remaining in-
stances were used for testing.
We then evaluated the six-step approach described in the previous section using
40 classifiers, by varying the threshold from 0.1 to 2.0, with an increment of 0.05. IFVs
were further optimized by considering only the RI most frequent instructions across the
collected samples, for some small positive integer RI, to construct the IFVs.
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We report our experimental results for Rl~4 and RI=5. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3
show the experimental results, in terms of accuracy, false positives, and false negatives,
for RI=4 and RI=5, respectively.





Figure 3.2 Evaluation results of the IFV classifier for RI=4 and 0.1< £ <2.0
Accuracy for Rl = 5
— False Pos.— False Neg.
Ace
Threshold
Figure 3.3 : Evaluation results of the IFV classifier for RI=5 and 0.1<£ <2.0
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3.2.2 Discussion
Some of the classifiers achieved 100% discrimination accuracy between the sam-
ple of benign instances and that of the W32 . Simile instances. This level of accuracy
was achieved for RI=4 and c = 0.5, as well as for RI=5 and s = 0.7. This is a rather prom-
ising result since the number of instructions used to compute the feature vectors is small,
hence saving space and computation time. As the threshold approached 2, the classifiers*
decision making became not much different than random guessing. This is due to the fact
that the Euclidian norm of any (normalized) IFV is less than or equal to 1 . placing any
IFV within a threshold of no more than 2 of any other IFV.
One limitation of this approach is that it has to visit all of the samples while com-
puting the distance from a suspect program to each member of each sample to identify
those members that are within s of the suspect program.
The next chapter describes and successfully evaluates a more general method for
attributing malware to its engine, without the need to store the feature vectors of all of
those malware instances that are each known to have been generated by a specific engine.
Chapter 4
Using NFVs to Detect Engine-generated
Malware
In this chapter, we describe and then evaluate an approach that uses /7-grams to
attribute engine-generated malware to its engine. In our experiments we evaluate the ap-
proach for n=2. For n-\, the approach is similar to the approach described in Chapter 3.
For n—2, the approach is similar to that taken by Abou-Assaleh et al. [1] to separate mali-
cious programs from benign ones, but not to attribute malware to a known
malware-generating engine.
4.1 Motivation
We were motivated to implement this /7-gram method by the success of a work on
attributing human text to its author [18]. With this method, only one signature would
need to be computed and maintained to detect members of a given family of malware
known to have been generated by a known engine. This approach requires no program
analysis beyond disassembly except for malware that is generated in the form of an as-
sembly language program.
4.2 Approach
We use the term rc-gram to refer to a sequence of n opcode mnemonics. For in-
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stance, a 2-gram is a sequence of two opcode mnemonics. An n-gram Frequency Vector
(NFV) is a tuple that maps w-grams with their frequencies in a given sequence of n or
more opcode mnemonics. Consider the following program /\ reduced to its sequence of
opcode mnemonics.
P : mov, mov, add, mov, add, sub, push, add, mov, sub
Considering only the 2-grams that are composed of the 3 most frequent opcode
mnemonics in P, the NFV of/3 is computed as shown in Figure 4.1. The NFV compo-
nents for the "relevanf bigrams submov, subadd, and subsub are not displayed
in the figure, since these bigrams do not occur in P.
Movmov movadd movsub addmov addadd addsiib
NFV (5J : (1 2 12 1)
Normalized: (0.143 0.2S6 0.143 0.2S7 0.143)
Figure 4.1: Computing the bigram frequency vector of P, using only P's three most frequent opcode
mnemonics.
A program's NFV is treated as a feature vector (signature) for the program. The
signature for a family (P,-)l< i < I of programs is computed as follows:
li=1 NFV(P.)
Family Signature = —
,
where the + operation on two NFVs is the outcome of the component-wise addition of the
components of the operands.
Our distance measure on NFVs is given by:
d(NFv„NFv„) -ag(gaaaSf J
2 8
which can also be expressed as
d(NFVx,NFV) = If., — ^^ ^-l
where m is the number of unique opcode mnemonics that are considered "relevant" by
the detector. d(NFVx, NFVy) computes the dissimilarity between NFVX and NFVV . For
identical strings of opcode mnemonics, this dissimilarity is 0.
Detection method 1 (Proposed method). In order to determine to which family, in a
given set of engine-generated malware families, a suspect program belongs, we designed
a classifier that computes the distance d between the NFV of the program and the signa-
ture of each family. (The NFV may not necessarily be taken whole; the detector may opt
to choose whatever «-gram it deems "'relevant** to the NFV.) The classifier compares the
label of the family that is closest (according to d) to the suspect program with the label of
the actual family of the suspect program. If the labels are different, then we increment the
mismatched counter. If the label of the suspect program is "benign** and that of the clos-
est family is "malicious", then we increment the false positive counter. If the label of the
suspect program is "malicious" and that of the closest family is "benign"*, then we incre-
ment the false negative counter. We then use the misclassification rate, false positive rate,
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Figure 4.2: Engine Signatures: The signatures of the engines are used to attribute malware instances
to known engines.
(k-nn). We also used a ^-nearest neighbor classifier (k-nn). A k-nn classifier is an in-
stance based classifier that has been shown to be powerful enough for most classification
problems [20, 35]. Given a training set T of malicious programs, the NFVs of all the pro-
grams in T are labeled and then stored in a set S. The distances between a suspect pro-
gram's NFV and each of the NFVs in S are computed; the k nearest ones, for an a-priori
chosen k, are then selected to vote. The family, be it one of benign programs or one of
JO
engine-generated malware, that has the majority of the votes is declared by the classifier
to be that of the suspect program. Where there are ties a winner is selected at random.
4.2.1 Evaluation
We collected 100 instances of each of the following families: W32. Simile,
W32.Evol, W32.VCL, W32 .NGVCK and benigns.
The proposed approach was evaluated by using as feature vectors for the collected
programs the 2-gram frequency vectors of the programs. These frequency vectors were
not used whole to evaluate the classifiers, instead we experimented with two strategies
for choosing the most relevant bigrams for the collected families of programs.
1
.
RI. Consider only those bigrams that are composed of any two of the RI most fre-
quent opcode mnemonics across the collected programs, for some small positive
integer RI.
2. RB. Consider only those RB most frequent bigrams across the collected pro-
grams, for some small positive integer RB.
We divided each family into a training set of size 90 and a testing set of size 10. Our
first classifier (implementing the proposed method) used the average of each family's
NFVs as the family signature. Our second classifier (implementing k-rm) was evaluated
for k = 1 to 20. For each of the classifiers we performed a 10-fold cross validation [19].
We used a new testing set each time. Letting A, denote the classification accuracy for
each of the ten runs of the 10-fold cross validation, we took the average of the A,'s as a
A 4.4 _L AJixTA2 •-rt 10
Cross Accuracy —
performance measure for the classifiers. 1^
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Figure 4.3 shows the achieved classification accuracies (using the RI strategy) of
the proposed classifier, as well as the k-rm classifier for k=\, 5, 10, 15, and 20.
FS 1-nn 5-nn 10-nn 15-nn 20-nn
RI=1 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
RI = 2 0.252 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400
RI = 3 0.850 0.958 0.936 0.936 0.928 0.930
RI = 4 0.852 0.996 0.988 0.988 0.982 0.978
RI = 5 0.698 0.992 0.976 0.964 0.964 0.958
RI = 6 0.768 0.988 0.976 0.964 0.956 0.948
RI = 7 0.834 0.994 0.992 0.970 0.964 0.954
RI = 8 0.824 1.000 1.000 0.996 0.974 0.964
RI = 9 0.852 0.996 0.994 0.992 0.978 0.964
RI=10 0.818 0.996 0.996 0.990 0.988 0.976
Figure 4.3 : Accuracies of the proposed classifier and those of k-nn. (RI feature selection strategy).
Figure 4.4 shows the achieved classification accuracies (using the RB strategy) of
the proposed classifier, as well as the &-nn classifier for k=\, 5, 10, 15, and 20.
4.2.2 Discussion
By taking the most frequent bigrams as the most relevant ones (i.e.. as features).
the proposed approach attained an accuracy of 95% using as family signature a 17-tuple
of real numbers. The signatures that enabled us to obtain this high level of accuracy are:
W32.Simile's Engine signature = (0.190, 0.030, 0.155, 0.048. 0.043. 0.057.
0.063,0.020, 0.076. 0.022. 0.0, 0.041. 0.109. 0.0, 0.122, 0.022. 0.0)
W32.Evol's Engine signature = (0.074. 0.026. 0.006. 0.326, 0.208. 0.014. 0.024. 0.073.
0.043. 0.048, 0.0. 0.071. 0.042, 0.0, 0.026. 0.019. 0.0)
n
W32.VCL's Engine signature = (0.1 1 1, 0.238, 0.142, 0.027, 0.076, 0.063, 0.063.0.033,
0.009, 0.018, 0.018, 0.054, 0.042, 0.0, 0.040, 0.052, 0.013)
W32.NGVCK's Engine signature (0.132, 0.113, 0.106, 0.048, 0.203,0.018.
0.055. 0.038, 0.022, 0.017. 0.070. 0.122. 0.007, 0.0, 0.007, 0.020. 0.017)
Benign's "Engine signature" = (0.165. 0.173, 0.091, 0.061, 0.052, 0.060, 0.052, 0.046,
0.060, 0.028, 0.019, 0.043, 0.024, 0.029, 0.02. 0.031, 0.029)
FS 1-nn 5-nn 10-nn 15-nn 20-nn
RB = 3 0.650 0.846 0.844 0.822 0.830 0.824
RB = 4 0.884 0.968 0.940 0.924 0.926 0.922
RB = 5 0.940 0.990 0.978 0.978 0.974 0.964
RB = 6 0.948 0.988 0.988 0.974 0.964 0.962
RB = 7 0.946 0.988 0.986 0.972 0.970 0.962
RB = 8 0.948 0.984 0.982 0.972 0.958 0.956
RB = 9 0.932 0.988 0.986 0.980 0.968 0.966
RB=10 0.940 0.990 0.980 0.978 0.970 0.966
RB=11 0.882 0.996 0.976 0.960 0.954 0.940
RB=12 0.910 0.996 0.980 0.972 0.956 0.944
RB= 13 0.926 0.998 0.984 0.976 0.968 0.962
RB = 14 0.948 1.000 0.984 0.968 0.954 0.952
RB = 15 0.936 1.000 0.988 0.972 0.958 0.948
RB=16 0.938 1.000 0.986 0.972 0.962 0.958
RB= 17 0.950 1.000 0.992 0.980 0.966 0.966
RB = 18 0.926 1.000 0.994 0.978 0.964 0.964
RB = 19 0.916 1.000 0.996 0.978 0.960 0.962
RB = 20 0.940 1.000 0.988 0.962 0.954 0.958
Figure 4.4: Accuracies of the proposed classifier and those of k-nn. (RB feature selection strategy).
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These signatures are small compared to those that were generated using as fea-
tures the bigrams composed of the most relevant instructions available across the sam-
ples. The 7-nn classifier was 100% accurate for RB= 14 to 20.
The overall performance of the proposed method can be compared to that of k-nn by
examining the following measures:
• Accuracy. The proposed method achieved a 95% accuracy for RB=17. which is a
high level of accuracy. 7-nn and 5-nn achieved 100% accuracy for RB =14 to 20.
and for RI =5, respectively.
• Time efficiency. The proposed method is, in general, more time efficient than
k-nn: the proposed method creates a family signature once and uses it to recognize
new or never-before-seen programs that belong to that family. k-nn must visit all
of the training instances each time it has to attribute a suspect program to a known
engine by finding the suspect's nearest neighbors.
• Space efficiency. The proposed method is more space efficient than k-nn. The
proposed method stores only one family signature, as an array of doubles, to
represent all of the training instances. k-nn has to load all of the training instance,
perhaps one at a time, in order to classify a suspect program.
Chapter 5
Conclusions and Directions for Further
Work
5.1 Research Outcomes
We proposed a fast filter for engine-generated malware instances using /7-gram
Instruction Frequency Vector (NFV) as a feature vector to attribute a malware instance to
the engine which generated it. The filtering process is optimized by computing the fre-
quencies of only the ""most relevant" fl-grams, for some measure of relevance (e.g., most
frequent w-grams).
Our first filtering method used the 7 -gram frequency vectors of malware in-
stances, to attribute the instances to the engine that generated them. The approach was
successful in discriminating variants of the W32 . Simile metamorphic malware from
benign programs.
Our second filtering method used the 2-gram frequency vectors of engine-
generated malware instances, to attribute each instance to the engine which generated it.
This approach was successful in filtering malware generated by W32. Simile's engine.
W32.Evol's engine, W32.NGVCK, and W32.VCL. Our results indicated that a small
engine signature can be created using only the most frequent instructions or the most fre-
quent bigrams across all the instances that the detector has on hand. A signature of only
17 doubles gave us an accuracy of 95%. The feature selection strategy was also shown to
J5
be important, since the RB strategy discussed in Chapter 4, is more space efficient than
the RI strategy.
The proposed approaches have been successfully used in attributing natural lan-
guage texts to their human authors [18]. By analogy to the fact that human authors tend to
have distinct writing patterns, the engines generating the malware can also have distinct
features that can be computed from the malware.
5.2 Directions for Future Work
In the future, we will expand our study to improve the feature selection strategies
and experiment with different classifiers. We will experiment with larger numbers of
malware instances and different families of malware. We will also do a more extensive
examination of the existing body of knowledge in forensic linguistics to see if more me-
thods from this field could be applied to malware detection. We will also see if byte
«-gram frequency vectors would give us a level of accuracy that is at least as high as the
opcode NFV used in the experiments. With byte NFVs the detector would not even be
required to disassemble suspect programs.
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